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Abstract: The aim of this paper is compare corporate governance and firm strategy 
before and after privatization. The design of control and performance evaluation 
systems in the pre and post-privatization periods is compared so that it can be 
understood in relation to the changes observed at a high corporate level (corporate 
governance and firm strategy). We carry out various case studies on five privatized 
Spanish companies. The results support several conclusions. First, the variables that 
are traditionally related to greater board independence in monitoring do not undergo 
variation after privatization. Second, the interests of the firms’ new ownership have 
an impact on firm strategy after privatization. Finally, control and performance 
evaluation system designs clearly align with firm strategy after privatization.
Keywords: Corporate governance, board of directors, privatization, strategy, control 
system, performance evaluation system. 
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1. Introduction
The literature suggests that changes in corporate governance due to privatization 
of a company can affect human resources management practices, such as 
performance evaluation systems (Cuevas, Alvarez-Dardet and Valle, 2007). 
Since privatization involves a change in the firm’s ownership, one would expect 
the owners’ objectives to be translated into the firm’s strategy and the way the 
firm is managed (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000).
Although privatization has been widely analyzed, most of the studies have 
adopted a macroeconomic or political perspective (Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez and 
Hitt, 2000). At an organizational level, some studies have emphasized the role of 
performance evaluation systems or incentives management during privatization 
(Okpara and Wynn, 2008; Cragg and Dyck, 2000; Schröder, 2003; Giancreco and 
Peccei, 2005). Other studies have focused on the analysis of the potential changes 
in strategy once firms have been privatized (Zahra and Hansen, 2000; Cuervo 
and Villalonga, 2000). However, few comprehensive studies have been made 
that embrace all the variables together (corporate governance, strategy, control 
and performance evaluation). One of the few studies that have traced how these 
changes go back to the essence of privatization – that is, the new ownership of 
the firm – is by Cuevas et alii (2007), who provide in-depth exploratory evidence 
on the greater formalization of incentives management when the ownership of a 
firm changes after privatization. 
Our argument is that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and publicly-owned 
firms are probably managed differently. Consequently, SOEs and publicly-
owned companies are expected to adopt different strategies and human resources 
practices (such as performance evaluation systems) to persuade or discount 
individuals or coalitions within a company and align their interests to those of 
the owners. 
The aim of this paper, then, is to compare corporate governance and firm 
strategy before and after privatization. We compare control and performance 
evaluation systems in the pre- and post-privatization periods, and try to 
understand them in relation to previous variables (corporate governance and 
firm strategy). We carry out various case studies on five Spanish privatized 
companies, and use a variety of data-gathering methods. All of the members of 
the top management teams were interviewed not just the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). 
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2. Literature review 
Agency theory assumes the existence of interest conflict between principals 
(owners) and agents (managers), who have different utility functions ( Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In this theoretical framework, the corporation’s board of 
directors is legally responsible for overseeing the performance of managers on 
behalf of owners’ interests. Nevertheless, this monitoring function exercised by 
the board is expected to be different in SOEs and public companies. 
In SOEs, multiple social and political pressures distract managers’ attention 
from maximizing profits (Rourke, 1984). Besides, the organization’s obligations 
go beyond shareholders, and liaise with other interest groups (stakeholders) 
connected to the organization, such as the employees, suppliers or clients. In 
agency theory, these connections are regarded as mere instrumental relationships 
the objective of which is to maximize profits (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
The role of the company’s management is to balance the interests of the various 
groups involved, this being the only way to ensure the survival of the company. 
However, the existence of multiple interests, characteristic of SOEs, could be 
translated into ‘fuzzy’ objectives that make it difficult to monitor the board’s 
function of evaluating managers’ performance. In fact, Nestor (2005) suggests 
that managerial decisions in SOEs are often the result of political rather than 
performance-oriented imperatives. Boards are either political appointees or 
civil servants and so are managers. Moreover, the disciplinary power of capital 
markets is absent in SOEs, which makes the problem of manager control worse. 
In contrast, publicly held companies are presumed to have just one principal: 
namely, the shareholders. These may be a diverse group, but the divergence of 
interests between principals and agents is reduced through the existence of (1) a 
market of ownership rights that enables the owners to sell if they are not satisfied 
with managerial performance; (2) the threat of takeover; and (3) the threat of 
bankruptcy. Besides, board members are elected on the basis of their business 
capabilities. So, privatization usually involves depoliticizing the decision-making 
process and company governance (Nestor, 2005). Specifically, after privatization, 
the company and its management are held to the forces of the market. In this new 
context, in which the company must survive and be successful, managers begin to 
develop strategies based on their analysis of the industry and the conditions of the 
market (Zahra et alii, 2000). Strategies of diversification and internationalization 
are usually common factors once SOEs have been privatized (Zahra, Neubaum 
and Huse, 2000).
Agency theory stresses that privatization changes the board’s way of overseeing 
the CEO and encourages formal performance evaluation (Young, Stedham and 
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Beekun, 2000). Although corporate boards are typically not required by law to 
establish formal management control over the CEO’s performance, some authors 
agree that a formal process for evaluating managers’ performance is a fundamental 
feature of corporate governance (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Alternatively, 
compensation design could be a contracting mechanism for aligning the interest 
of managers (agents) with the interest of owners (principals) (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Agency theory’s argument that the board exercises greater control is linked 
to the fact that after privatization ‘core’ shareholders will hold a sufficiently high 
proportion of a company’s shares to justify their combining ownership with 
some degree of board control, in contrast to the dispersed shareholders of SOEs 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In fact, Michael and Pearce (2004) have suggested 
that constraints imposed as a result of shareholder pressure on the board of 
directors could be regarded as a valuable solution to the agency problem, as they 
can actively commit managers not to undertake certain tasks.
Based on the previous discussion, our proposition is as follows: 
Greater board control of firm management and a clearer definition of firm 
strategy after privatization will imply the adoption of a more formal performance 
evaluation system. 
3. Research methodology
In order to compare corporate governance, strategy and performance evaluation 
systems before and after privatization, we employ a multi-case research method. 
In line with Yin’s (1994) suggestions, the five cases that this study examines 
are not an arbitrary selection. They include all possible combinations of three 
control variables: namely, (1) the industrial sector (because companies should 
belong to different industries), (2) company size, and (3) privatization methods. 
Two additional restrictions in this case study framework are that the companies 
under examination are large enough to guarantee the existence of formal 
corporate governance and were privatized after 1996 for two reasons:
1. The last wave of privatizations in Spain began after 1996 with the 
“Modernization Program of the Public Sector”, which encourages the 
privatization of efficient SOEs and focuses on non-efficient SOEs to 
prepare them for privatization.
2. This study uses questionnaires by which the members of the top 
management team of each company provide information about the five 
years before and after privatization. Thus, the managers in this study 
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have enough history and experience within the company to compare the 
pre- and post-privatization periods. 
Our primary data was collected from 18 interviews with top management 
teams (5 managers were interviewed in Endesa, 4 in Repsol, 2 in Enagas, 
3 in Iberia and 4 in Retevision). Although data was mainly collected from 
questionnaires sent to top managers, triangulation was achieved using other 
sources of information such as Annual Accounting Statements, the Spanish 
Central Bank’s database or SEPI reports (Spanish Society of State-Owned 
Companies). The whole set of data covers ten years (the five years before and 
after privatization) although the period under consideration varies according to 
the time each company was privatized. 
The data collection and analyses were highly iterative processes in this 
research (Yin, 1994). Staggering the volume of data in this study was possible 
by focusing on three dimensions or variables: (1) the company’s governance 
structure, (2) company strategies, and (3) manager control and performance 
evaluation systems.
For our first variable, that is, the company’s governance structure, we used the 
specific measurements reported in (Coles et alii, 2001; Hsu, 2010): (1) separate 
positions for the CEO and the chairperson of the board, (2) board composition, 
and (3) ownership structure and concentration. 
For the second variable, company strategies, we use Dess and Davis’ (1980) 
measures. As these authors state, classifying firm strategies into one generic 
Porter’s typology (cost leadership, differentiation and focus strategy) is a valuable 
tool, but it also implies an atomistic view of strategy because each firm is unique 
in all respects. Alternatively, Dess and Davis (1980) propose a new view that 
recognizes commonalities among firms as far as the higher or lower importance 
of a set of strategic choices is concerned. This notion of strategic choices helps 
track the role that corporate governance (and firm ownership) plays in pursuing 
a specific purpose, making decisions and adopting competitive methods, all of 
them inherent in the concept of strategy (White & Hammermesh, 1981, pp. 
216). Thus, managers had to score a total of 20 items (strategic choices) using a 
five-point Likert scale on which 1 implied a low level of relevance of the strategic 
competitive item and 5 indicated high relevance. As with other variables, each 
item refers to both pre- and post-privatization periods. 
Finally, the control system was measured applying the typology proposed by 
Whitley (1999), attending to the following dimensions: degree of formalization 
of the control system, degree of exerted control, commitment and participation 
of the employees in the control activity, and the scope of the information used. In 
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addition, we used measurements based on the work of Carpenter and Westphal 
(2001) to determine the degree of control exerted by the board of directors on 
top managers. And for managers’ performance evaluation systems, we used Scott 
and Tiessen’s measurement (1999) to group them in three categories: financial, 
non-financial and other performance measures.
3.1 The case studies
Retevisión. The privatization of Retevisión (telecommunications sector) was 
initiated in 1997 when the State called for a PO of the sale of 60% of the 
company’s stock. This brought a capital increase of 10% to be covered by the 
investors, while the State’s participation was reduced to 30%. In this first phase of 
the company’s privatization, two of the major players in terms of industrial groups 
in the country entered the company as shareholders (the public utility companies 
Endesa and Union Fenosa), as well as an international operator (Telecom Italia) 
and various financial institutions (Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa and Unicaja, amongst 
others). A new chairman took on the role of running the company, and stayed 
with them until 2000. 
The liberalization of the sector reached its highest point in 1998 with the 
passing of the General Law on Telecommunications. To sum up, the sector’s 
liberalization boiled down to a) a reduction in the prices of services offered as a 
result of competition, as well as other effects; b) market growth, and c) a rise in 
the number of employees in the sector, either directly or created by the knock-on 
effect. In 1998, the company had sales of 364.2 million euros, an increase of 54% 
on the previous year, and the number of employees increased to 67% in the same 
period (1,286 in 1997 and 1,909 in 1998). 
The privatization of 30% of the company’s stock took place in 1999. This 
transferal of 30% of Retevisión assets was based on the strict conditions of the 
legal framework under which the first privatization operation took place. 
Privatization sparked the strategic orientation of Retevisión as a major player 
in the telecommunications market. Retevisión also changed the way people 
behaved in the sector, with a clear, flexible and open policy. The company’s strategy 
created competition in the sector, which led to openness in the market, lower 
prices for basic services and the increased competitiveness of other companies. 
 Enagas: The National Gas Company (Enagas) was created in 1972 with the aim 
of creating a network of gas conducts throughout the Spanish Peninsula, and 
was entirely owned by the State through the National Industry Institute (I.N.I). 
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In 1991 an event took place that had a resounding effect on the gas sector in 
Spain. The creation of a new company named Gas Natural SDG brought about 
the restructuring of the distribution sector and better coordination with Enagas 
in the division of labor. 
In terms of the structure of the company, the most important event took place 
in 1993: the signing of an intention protocol for the complete integration of the 
Spanish gas sector. The aim was for Gas Natural SDG to acquire most of the 
control of Enagas. To simplify the characteristics of this complex operation, it 
was agreed that both companies would have, from that moment on, the same 
CEO. Based on this agreement, the negotiations concluded with Gas Natural 
SDG purchasing 91% of the Enagas stock in 1994 and acquiring the remaining 
9% in 1998. 
The law passed on 6th June 2000 laid out the plans for completing the process 
of liberalization in the gas sector. The Ministerial Order of February 2002 
established the specific framework for tariff implementation and payment rights 
necessary to fund the modernization of the gas network, transport, storage and 
distribution of natural gas. This would enable the system to be run in a proper 
and structured way. 
In 2003 the liberalization of commercialization in the gas sector was 
concluded successfully in such a way that from January onwards of this same 
year any customer could choose their natural gas supplier. Finally, on the 26th 
June 2003, a European Directive on gas was published, which regulated the 
liberalization process in the internal European gas market. 
In 2002 the company completed its flotation on the stock exchange and began 
its journey on the stock market with a commitment to the highest quality practices 
of corporate government, based on the pillars of openness, independence and the 
defense of the shareholders rights. 
Endesa: The third company chosen as a case study was Endesa, which belonged 
to a sector with considerable economic and technical significance in Spain: 
electricity. The structure of the company’s ownership had been changed during 
a ten-year privatization program via four public offerings (POs) in 1988, 1994, 
1997, and 1998, with the State’s holding in the company being reduced to 75.6%, 
66.89%, 25% and 3%, respectively. 
In the group of main shareholders in Endesa there were four major financial 
institutions: the banks, BSCH (3%), BBVA (2.7%), and the building societies 
La Caixa (2.5%) and Caja Madrid (4.2%). Also, during the study period 
the change produced in the industrial sector caused knock-on changes in the 
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strategy followed by the company, partly as a response to the new competitive 
environment. 
The passing of the Basic Law for the National Electrical Sector (LOSEN) 
in 1994 and the Electrical Protocol of 1996 introduced measures such as the 
reduction of entry barriers into the generating business or greater facilities for the 
sale of electricity to third parties, which opened up the market to competition. 
The new features of the electrical sector helped the companies to operate more 
efficiently and focused on customer services. 
In the middle of the 1990s (1994-1998), and coinciding with the successive 
POs which led to the privatization of Endesa, the company strengthened 
its competitive position in the electrical sector (characterized by a gradual 
liberalization), with the diversification of other sectors that experienced growth 
and internationalization. The spectacular increase in market share from 1990 
onwards, and the number of Endesa customers reflect, amongst other factors, 
the process of business expansion at both a national and an international level. 
Iberia: Iberia is one the major European network operators of air travel for 
passengers and cargo, although it is also involved in such related business activities 
as the maintenance and distribution of aircraft for both Iberia and other airlines. 
In the privatization of Iberia there were three phases: (1) direct sales, in 
which the “industrial partners” were selected, (2) direct sales, in which the 
“institutional partners” were selected, and (3) a final phase by which privatization 
was completed through POs. These three phases involved the transferral of 
10%, 30% and 53.7% of the company’s stock capital belonging to SEPI (State 
Company for Industrial Participations). The rest of the stock remained in the 
hands of the company’s employees. 
With respect to the first phase which took place in February 1999, a framework 
agreement was reached with American Airlines, British Airways, Iberia and 
SEPI for which NEWCO (a company controlled 90% by British Airways and 
10% by American Airlines) agreed to purchase 10% of Iberia’s stock. This trading 
operation was the first phase of the company’s privatization scheme. 
Also in 1999, 30% of Iberia’s stock was transferred, with 10% of the shares 
going to Caja Madrid, 7.3% to the BBVA, 6.7% to Logista Aeroportuaria S.A, 
and 3% each to the Corte Inglés and the Ahorro Corporation S.A. 
Finally, in 2001, in the third phase of the operation, the board of directors of 
SEPI sold 53.7% of Iberia’s stock. In this year, the company increased its income 
to 4,581 million euros and employed 25,000 workers. 
In the year 2000 Iberia initiated a new management plan, which was in force 
until 2003. The aim of the plan was mainly to consolidate the company in the 
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market, improve its financial and operating profitability ratios, and increase the 
shareholder value. The company improved its competitive positions in Europe 
(share quote, 34.5%) and maintained its leadership in the domestic market 
(share quote, 70.4%), and the intercontinental market (share quote, 15.1% in 
Europe-Latin America air traffic, where the company was the market leader with 
a share quote of 44.5% in Spain-Latin American air traffic). As for the governing 
bodies of the company, it should be pointed out that a new CEO was appointed 
to drive Iberia’s privatization. He remained in the position from 1996 to 2003. 
Repsol: The fifth company chosen in our multi-case study belongs to the fuel 
sector, which has been strictly regulated in Spain and has operated as a state 
monopoly since 1927. In fact, the liberalizing legal framework that now affects 
the entire sector was not established until 1998 when the Law on Hydrocarbons 
in Spain was passed. This meant the complete opening of the fuel market and the 
regulation of all activities involving gas. The maximum sale prices for fuel were 
done away with and the natural gas sector was liberalized at a greater pace than 
the established European average. Privatization was carried out over a period of 
eight years and via such financial mechanisms as direct sales, bond issues and 
POs. The privatization of the whole company concluded in 1997.
The process had started in 1989 when 26% of the company’s stock was put up 
for sale. In 1992 and 1993 the privatization process continued via a comprehensive 
share offer entirely for wholesale investors and institutions, which reduced the 
State’s participation in the company to 30%. In 1995 and 1996, successive POs 
took place, this time addressed to retailers and small-scale investors. This had the 
effect of reducing the State’s stake in the company to 10% with the other 90% in 
the hands of a diverse group of private and institutional investors. In 1997, the 
process of privatization for the company was completed with the sale (also by 
PO) of the remaining 10% that the State owned. 
The company adopted a hitherto unseen strategy of international expansion 
during its fourth phase of privatization in 1996. Its strategic priority was to 
initiate its expansion in Latin America as a worldwide energy company. 
In 1999, the most important event in Repsol’s history took place when the 
firm was the successful bidder for a 14.99% stake in YPF, the largest public petrol 
and gas company in Latin America at an auction called by the Government of 
Argentina. With the acquisition of YPF, the company was transformed into 
a major player in the energy field in Latin America and Spain, and advanced 
notably towards their strategic aims. Thus, during 1999, net profits of the 
company surpassed 1,000 million Euros, which reflected a rise of 16% on the 
previous year. By the end of 1999, the number of employees had risen to 33,884.
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In the year 2000, the process of integration between Repsol and YPF was 
completed, and created the need to rethink some processes and policies regarding 
decision making in the company, which in turn gave way to a new management 
model. 
With respect to corporate governance, the CEO was the same from 1987 to 
1996. In June 1996, when the Conservative Popular Party came to power, a new 
CEO was appointed, who would stay in the post until 2004.
4. Findings
4.1 A general overview of the five case studies and their socio-
economic and political context
Now that the five case studies have been described, some aspects of the political 
and socio-economic context in which the privatizations occurred should be 
discussed. They took place in the period beginning in 1996, with the coming to 
power of the Popular Party, when there was an obvious change in the approach to 
privatization. The so-called Privatization Advisory Council, a body to inform the 
proposed sale of public enterprises and to verify compliance with the principles 
of openness, transparency and free competition, was created. Each operation 
had to be informed by the Council prior to taking the decision to sell. Also, a 
Privatization Plan, which set out the objectives, methods and pace of operations, 
was also created. In June 1996, an agreement by the Spanish cabinet on the 
foundations of the Modernization Program of the Business Public sector (known 
as the Privatization Program) was approved. This meant a new orientation of the 
public business sector, with a redistribution of functions in the public and private 
sectors of the economy. This reassignment was embodied in the withdrawal of 
the public sector from virtually all business activity.
The privatization program classified public enterprises into four groups. The 
first group were companies to be privatized immediately because of their high 
profitability and attractiveness to potential investors. Among these companies, 
known as “the jewels of the crown”, were Enagas, Endesa and Repsol. The second 
group was composed of companies in sectors that were about to be reorganized, 
but were important here because substantial income could be obtained by their 
sale. Retevisión was in this group. The third group was composed of those of 
companies that required restructuring or improvements prior to sale. This 
group included Iberia. And the final group was made up of companies that 
were undergoing some kind of restructuring, but which would not be able to be 
privatized in the short term for strategic or social reasons.
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As can be seen, all state-owned companies were considered amenable to 
privatization, regardless of their economic situation. Therefore, the privatization 
policy in this period can be qualified as mass privatization, and reflects a new 
conception of the role of the public sector in the economy. This is what radically 
differentiates this period from previous ones.
As some authors have suggested (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2005), it is important 
to contextualize research to have a comprehensive understanding not only of 
the political and socio-economic circumstances but also of the idiosyncrasy of a 
specific country. A difference in national context can, for example, limit the extent 
to which standard agency theory assumptions about investor risk preferences, 
managerial behavior and board functions can be applied (Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2005). In this regard, Aguilera (2005, pp. 198) suggests that Spain, along with 
Italy and to some extent France, follows the so-called Latin model, which is 
characterized by strong state intervention, weak labor participation at the 
company level, and concentrated firm ownership. Overall, according to Aguilera 
(2005), the Spanish corporate governance scene is composed of newly privatized 
firms owned by core investors (some of whom are foreign), a weak market for 
corporate control, and sporadic use of Anglo-Saxon practices, although certain 
reforms have been undertaken to increase the transparency and accountability of 
firms, as well as the efficiency of boards of directors. 
Privatized firms are expected to improve control mechanisms and align owner 
and manager goals better by adopting a more formal performance evaluation 
system. Although these issues are expected from an agency theory perspective, 
we should acknowledge the idiosyncrasy of Spanish corporate governance and 
the importance of context to understand the corporate governance of firms 
before and after privatization. 
The various case studies show that the ownership structures during the 
study period were conditioned by privatization processes and the evolution of 
regulation and liberalization in the sectors. However, they confirm that whatever 
privatization method was used (direct sales, POs, bond issues, etc.), the public 
sector has been replaced not by an anonymous mass of small shareholders but 
rather groups (the so-called “hard-core”). Through these hard-core groups, the 
State privatized significant amounts of shares and gave them to prominent entities 
with the guarantee that they would not be transferred, thus giving some stability to 
the composition of capital.It should be pointed out that the Spanish government 
temporarily granted “golden shares” to three of the companies analyzed (Iberia, 
Repsol and Endesa, which expired in 2006 for Iberia and Repsol, and 2008 for 
Endesa). In this way the State had the right to veto or authorize certain strategic 
decisions, and the chance to block foreign shareholdings. 
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Finally, the comparative analysis of our five studies seems to show that firms 
reorganize their strategies once they are in private hands. This fits with agency 
theory, which supports the greater discretion of the board of directors after 
privatization to adopt strategic decisions based on market analysis and industrial 
conditions. In general terms, then, it seems that the strategies of the companies 
analyzed favored market growth after privatization and were characterized by 
expansion and diversification. Although we cannot assure that these strategies 
are more prospective than defensive in nature, we observed special attention to 
efficiency and the reduction of operational costs after privatization. 
Below, the firm governance structure, strategic orientation and performance 
evaluation systems are compared using data from the five case studies before and 
after privatization.
4.2 Firm governance structure
We are going to analyze data on the three factors used to measure the board’s 
level of supervision (Young et alii, 2000): that is, (1) separate positions for the 
CEO and the chairperson of the board, (2) the composition of the board and, (3) 
the structure/concentration of ownership. 
A dichotomous variable was used for the first factor with a value of 1 when 
the positions of CEO and chairman were held by the same individual, and a 
value of 0 when they were held by different individuals. We observed that one 
of these five companies had different individuals for the two positions after 
privatization. Unexpectedly, then, no changes were observed in four out of the 
five companies, which entrusted the two positions to the same individual before 
and after privatization. Agency theory predicts that the positions of CEO and 
chairman should be occupied by different individuals after privatization so that 
the board of directors can have greater control over managers. 
To analyze the composition of the board, we classified the members according 
to Baysinger and Butler (1985), Kim (2007), Heracleous (2001), and Rutherford 
and Buchholtz (2007). Those members with a contractual relationship in 
the company were classified as insiders. Those members who did not hold 
professional positions in the company and were named only as members of the 
board were defined as outsiders. 
Our analysis does not show a clear change after privatization. In the pre-
privatization period, outsiders represented an average of 79% whereas post-
privatization this percentage was 88%. And contrary to theoretical expectations, 
one of the companies had a lower percentage of outsiders after privatization 
(83%) than in the period before privatization (92%). With regards to the year of 
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privatization, there was no clear tendency to increase the percentage of external 
advisors in comparison to the pre- and post-privatization periods. So this cannot 
be viewed as a positive step to create a more diverse and independent board. In 
this regard, Cabeza and Gomez’s (2007) results also show a lack of independence 
of the Spanish boards of directors after privatization. 
One issue which must be highlighted regarding the composition of the board is 
the turnover of directors. More specifically, three of the companies analyzed show 
an increase in the rotation on their boards, going from .08 before privatization 
to .24 after. On the other hand, in two of the five companies studied, rotation 
decreased considerably, going from .52 before privatization to .07 afterwards. 
This is partly due to the high level of rotation observed in the years leading up 
to the privatization of these companies, which may be interpreted as preparation 
for the company going into private hands. 
Finally, we analyzed the ownership structure of the companies using the 
percentage of corporate stock in the hands of major shareholders (that is, 
those who own more than 5% of the stock) (ICON) (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 
1989). Table 1 shows significant shareholders (ICON) for each company both 
before and after privatization. Figure 1 clearly shows a high concentration of 
capital before privatization. This concentration is reasonable because, before 
privatization, all or most of the shares in these companies are the property of the 
state. After privatization, although the concentration of capital generally falls, 
the average percentage in the hands of important shareholders is still high, and 
reaches almost 47%.
Table 1: Stock in the hands of major shareholders (%) (ICON)
Retevision Enagas Endesa Iberia Repsol Average
Before privatization 100.00 100.00 66.95 92.18 76.97 87.22
After privatization 74.22 81.51 15.22 39.56 23.53 46.81
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One of the characteristics of corporate governance in the continental 
European model
is the presence of major shareholders in the company stock (financial 
institutions, family groups and other companies), who usually exert considerable 
control over the company (Fernández and Arrondo, 2005). In countries like 
Spain, the government actively promoted the creation of stable investors, largely 
banks, after the privatization program (Tribo, Berrone and Surroca, 2007). This 
was particularly the case between 1996 and 2003. 
In our study, and as was expected from a theoretical viewpoint, we observe 
the existence of ‘core’ shareholders (such as financial institutions) who hold a 
sufficiently high proportion of a company’s shares. This seems to imply some 
degree of control over the board, in contrast to the dispersed shareholding and 
‘free-rider problem’ of SOEs. Yet there is no agreement or clear empirical evidence 
on what proportion is ‘sufficiently high’. Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) suggest 
that 5% could be considered enough to allow an owner to sway or veto strategic 
decisions. Our findings suggest that there were financial institutions with at 
least 5% of capital that was privatized in four out of the five cases (see table 2). 
With the exception of the first company, in which no financial institution is a 
shareholder, three of the companies have two financial institutions holding 10%, 
17.75% and 15.7% of the capital. 
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Table 2: Financial institutions with a stock participation of over 5% 
after the privatization of the companies
Number of 
financial 
institutions
Participation in the capital Total participation
Retevision 0 0%
Enagas 3 Bancaja (5%); Cajatsur (5%); 
Cam (5%)
15%
Endesa 2 Caja Madrid (5%); Caixa (5%) 10%
Iberia 2 Caja Madrid (9.84); BBVA (7.91%) 17.75%
Repsol 2 Caixa (10.7%); BBVA (5%) 15.70%
Average 11.69%
These results are similar to those obtained recently by Cabeza and Gomez 
(2007), who showed that financial institutions are major shareholders in 75% of 
Spanish privatized companies. 
Generally, no matter what method was used for the privatization process 
or how long it took, institutional groups attend to make up the stable core of 
shareholders committed to the proper running of the company. Through these 
hard-core groups, the State privatizes significant amounts of shares in order to 
grant them to prominent entities, with the guarantee that these shares will not 
be transferred. In this way, the composition of the capital is guaranteed a certain 
stability. 
4.3 Strategic competitive factors
The description and contextualization of the five case studies shows that in some 
cases privatized companies led the process of liberalization in the sectors in 
which they operated, thus allowing for the creation of market competition. This 
was the case of Retevision, when they broke the monopoly that Telefónica had 
over Spain. In the natural gas sector, the beginning of the liberalization process 
made Enagas an essential vehicle for the entry of new operators into the supply 
market. 
In general, the strategies followed by privatized companies have favored 
market growth and have been characterized by the expansion and diversification 
of new sectors. This is the case of Repsol and Endesa. For the latter, the measures 
taken to open up to competition in the electrical sector required the company 
to operate more efficiently and with a management plan better geared towards 
quality control and customer services. 
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In general terms, bureaucracy and pressure from stakeholders mean that 
SOEs have greater organizational inertia. These were driving forces behind the 
reduction of incentives to produce change. So the companies’ resources needed 
to be modified to make them more competitive (Romero 2006). SOEs tend to 
be more conservative and have a defensive attitude towards the market (Tan and 
Litschert, 1994).
Following privatization, companies and their management were limited by 
market forces, which created a new scenario in which they had survive and be 
successful. In this context, the board of directors began to plan and develop 
strategies based on the analysis of the industry and market conditions (Zahra 
et alii, 2000). 
Privatization creates a favorable environment for the companies to make 
foreign investments, particularly in technology transfer and product and 
marketing techniques (Zahra et alii, 2000). Private property prompts directors 
to take riskier decisions due to innovations in products and organization (Zahra 
and Hansen, 2000). Also, following privatization, the board of directors have 
more freedom to redefine the organizational targets of their key shareholders 
(Yarrow, 1986). 
We shall now move on to look at various factors regarding competition. 
Table 3 shows the average scores of responses given by top management teams 
to twenty questions on their company’s strategic orientation. The comparison of 
scores assigned to the pre- and post-privatization periods shows that the weight 
or relative importance of the different strategic factors is quite similar in both 
periods. There is no change in the strategic pattern of the company. However, 
despite having the same strategic orientation, the companies strengthened all 
their strategic factors after privatization. Scores on all items (except item 13) were 
systematically higher after privatization (see figure 2). This was corroborated 
when the analysis was reproduced individually for each company. It should also 
be noted that the standard deviations of 13 of the 20 items were lower after 
privatization. This suggests a tendency to value strategic items similarly and 
implies that companies converge toward a similar weighting of competitiveness 
with respect to other strategic factors. 
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Table 3: Strategic competitive factors before and after privatization 
(with standard deviations in parentheses)
Before After
Wilcoxon test
Z p-value
1. New product development 3.00
(.71)
4.30
(.82)
-1.62 .10
2. Customer services 2.67 
(.62)
4.70
(.41)
-2.02 .04
3. Continuous effort to obtain cost reductions 2.93
 (1.36)
4.75
(.25)
-2.02 .04
4. Quality control on products/services 3.80 
(1.10)
4.57
(.31)
-1.83 .07
5. Training and experience of human resources 3.53
 (.51)
4.35
(.49)
-1.84 .07
6. Competitive prices 2.67 
(.94)
4.07
 (1.20)
-1.83 .07
7. Wide range of products/services 2.27 
(.83)
3.35
(.89)
-1.21 .22
8. Development/improvement of old products/services 3.00
(1.22)
4.08
(.64)
-1.83 .07
9. Brand 3.00 
(1.22)
4.05
(.72)
-1.46 .14
10. Innovation in marketing techniques and methods 2.33
 (1.31)
3.63
(.74)
-1.35 .18
11. Distribution channel control 2.44
 (1.26)
3.68 
(1.59)
-1.60 .11
12. Raw materials for products/services 4.00
(1.00)
4.40
(.55)
-1.00 .32
13. Minimization of external financial support 2.60
(.55)
2.35
(.60)
-.74 .46
14. Specialization in geographical segments 2.53
 (1.50)
3.22
(1.33)
-.67 .50
15. Ability to make specific products/services 3.00
(.71)
3.75
(.50)
-1.84 .07
16. Products/services with high price in the market 2.40
 (.89)
2.85
(1.24)
-1.34 .18
17. Promotion and marketing in the media by other 
companies in the sector 
2.33 
(.85)
3.18
 (1.15)
-1.46 .14
18. Reputation within the sector 3.53
 (.65)
4.42
(.28)
-1.84 .07
19. Foresight of market growth 3.47
 (1.12)
4.60
(.45)
-1.83 .07
20. Process innovation in products/services 3.13
(1.12)
4.18
(.83)
-1.60 .11
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A Wilcoxon non-parametric test (Siegel and Castellan, 1988) was applied 
to test the statistically significant differences between scores for strategic factors 
before and after privatization. As in the signal test, results showed statistically 
significant differences (p=.00). These results were corroborated with the 
t-student test, which also rejected the null hypothesis of similarity among average 
scores before and after privatization (p=.00).
Although company strategies followed a similar pattern before and after 
privatization, there were differences in such items as customer service (item 2), 
cost reduction (item 3), quality control for products/services (item 4), training 
and experience building for human resources (item 5), competitive prices (item 
6), the development and improvement of products and services (item 8), the 
ability to create specific products and services (item 15), reputation within the 
sector (item 18) and foresight regarding market growth (item 19). These results 
make sense because marketing, efficiency and product innovation are key factors 
for competition in the market, once the company is privatized (Zhara et alii, 
2000). Table 3 shows the results of the Wilcoxon non-parametric test for each 
item.
The only exception to this tendency in strategic factors and with a lower value 
after privatization is item 13, which refers to the use of external financing. The 
results show that the minimization of this type of financing is no longer such a 
main aim once the company is privatized. 
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4.4 Control system
Table 4 displays the averages of all the companies for each of the items used to 
measure the control system. The responses given by managers in the questionnaire 
were grouped for the periods before and after privatization.
Table 4: Control system before and after privatization 
(with standard deviations in parentheses)
Before After
Wilcoxon test
Z p-value
1. To what extent does the board monitor top 
management strategic decision making?
3.25
(0.96)
4.53
(0.57)
-1.46 .14
2. To what extent does the board formally evaluate the 
performance of top managers?
3.08
(0.17)
3.98
(1.05)
-1.10 .27
3. To what extent does the board defer to top managers’ 
judgment on final strategic decisions?
2
(0.00)
1.95
(0.45)
-1.00 .32
4. To what extent does the board receive systematic and 
regular information about firm management?
3.25
(0.50)
4.55
(0.51)
-1.63 .10
5. How often does the board request information from 
managers?
2.67
(0.82)
4.15
(0.65)
-1.84 .07
6. Assess the following characteristics of the information 
requested by the board to managers:
a) Information about potential future facts (e.g. new 
normative, regulation)
b) Information about factors external to the company (e.g. 
economic, technological and labour conditions)
c) Neither economic nor qualitative information (e.g. 
preference of the clients, attitudes of the personnel)
2.67
(0.82)
2.92
(0.69)
2.42
(0.50)
4.18
(0.50)
3.72
(0.39)
4.02
(0.66)
-1.63
-1.46
-1.83
.10
.14
.07
7. To what extent are the following the result of agreement 
between the board of directors and the management team:
a) The evaluation system
b) The remuneration system
c)The frequency of the reporting
d)The type of information given
2.42
(0.83)
2.17
(0.33)
2.42
(0.83)
2.42
(0.83)
4.38
(0.60)
4.43
(0.60)
4.18
(0.61)
4.35
(0.42)
-1.63
-1.84
-1.60
-1.83
.10
.07
.11
.07
Figure 3 shows clear differences in the averages for all the representative 
items of the control applied by the board of directors in both periods (before and 
after privatization), with the exception of item 3. The value of this item (value= 
2) reflects little difference in the conception of management of the two bodies 
(board of directors and top management team).
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The differences described in the paragraph above have a tendency to increase. 
After privatization, there is a clear tendency to greater control by the board of 
directors over decision-making and an increasing demand of information about 
the management of the company (item 5). As well as these two aspects, which 
are the most valued by the control system, we also observe a greater need for 
qualitative information (item 8). Finally, the system allows managers to take 
greater part in the design of remuneration systems (item 10) and in the type of 
information given (item 12). Table 4 reflects the results of the Wilcoxon non-
parametric test for each item.
4.5 Performance evaluation systems
The use of performance measures in the evaluation process
Table 5 indicates that, in general, financial measures (item 1) are mostly used 
to measure managerial performance both before and after privatization. 
Nevertheless, after privatization, the use of quality measures (item 3) to evaluate 
managers is in second position (that is, they are used more). Likewise, as observed 
in Figure 4, there is also an increase in the widespread use of all the measures, 
which means an increase in the intensity of control mechanisms.
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Table 5: Use of performance measures in management evaluation 
Before After
Wilcoxon test
Z p-value
1. Financial measures 2.34 3.93 -1.83 .07
2. Commercial measures 2.38 3.02 -.92 .36
3. Quality measures 1.58 3.90 -1.83 .07
4. Innovation measures 1.31 2.95 -1.63 .10
5. Other performance measures 2.00 4.02 -1.60 .11
Figure 4: Average use of performance measures in management evaluation
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A closer look at the increasing use of control mechanisms and the most frequent 
measures used (financial measures: costs, profits and productivity) reveals the 
following: first, two-thirds of the responses indicated that cost measures were 
used more intensely after privatization, while one-third indicated no increase in 
level of use. As far as profits are concerned, 100% of the managers agreed that 
these increased after privatization. Finally, half of the managers indicated that 
productivity measures were used more intensely after privatization, whereas the 
other half considered that they were used to the same extent as in the pre- and 
post- privatization periods. Table 5 reflects the results of the Wilcoxon non-
parametric test for each item.
 
The use of performance measures in the remuneration process 
Likewise, the use of performance measures for management remuneration 
increases in intensity in the post-privatization period (Table 6 and Figure 5), 
which emphasizes the use of financial measures (item 1) and quality measures 
(item 3). Nevertheless, we should point out that after privatization the most 
significant increase is in “other performance measures” (item 5), which refers to 
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external measures (benchmarking, stock exchange prices and others), and which 
doubles its value from an average of 2.08 to 4.02.
Table 6: Use of performance measures in management remuneration
Before After
Wilcoxon test
Z p-value
1. Financial measures 2,21 3.93 -1.83 .07
2. Commercial measures 1.58 2.51 -1.60 .11
3. Quality measures 1.71 3.89 -1.83 .07
4. Innovation measures 1.19 2.90 -1.60 .11
5. Other performance measures 2.08 4.02 -1.60 .11
Figure 5: Average use of performance measures in management remuneration
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These behaviors can be analyzed in more detail by comparing the use of 
the most frequent measures (financial, quality and external) before and after 
privatization. More than 90% believed that financial measures were in greater 
use for setting managerial remuneration after privatization. Two-thirds of the 
managers polled believed that quality measures were used more frequently 
after privatization. And finally, more than 80% believed that “other performance 
measures” (external measures) were used more after privatization. Table 6 reflects 
the results of the Wilcoxon non-parametric test for each item.
5. Conclusion
In this research, we compare corporate governance and firm strategy before 
and after privatization. We also compare control and performance evaluation 
systems in the pre- and post-privatization periods, and try to understand them 
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in relation to previous variables (corporate governance and firm strategy). 
Although privatization has been the object of a considerable amount of research, 
most studies have adopted a macroeconomic or political approach. Our study, 
however, adopted an organization-level approach. Our research makes some 
important contributions to the previous literature. 
First, we predicted that privatization would cause a change in owners’ interests, 
with subsequent changes in the board of directors to support the new interests 
of the new ownership. From an agency perspective, more independent boards 
(removed from the political arena) should appear after privatization. However, 
our empirical findings show that the board of directors did not become more 
independent after privatization. In fact, the data suggest that privatization does 
not imply a change in terms of who takes on the chairman and CEO positions in 
a privatized company, because these positions are occupied by the same person.
On the basis of the results obtained from the boards of directors, we also 
observed that privatization does not necessarily increase the number of outsiders. 
This may suggest that in Spain, unlike other countries, boards of directors are 
not open to external members despite corporate governance recommendations 
to have outsiders on boards. Although there was no variation in the percentages 
of outsiders/insiders, what should be highlighted here is the concentration of 
shares after privatization. Indeed, after privatization in most of the companies 
analyzed financial institutions with representatives on the board had more than 
5% capital,. In these firms, these directors had considerable influence for some 
years, reaching almost .5 in one of the companies studied in one specific year. 
Second, we conclude that there is no change in strategy in the companies 
analyzed as a consequence of the change in ownership. One possible explanation 
for this is that the lack of significant changes in the board automatically meant 
that that there was a corresponding lack of change in strategic orientation. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the lack of change in company strategies, we observed 
that privatized companies put greater emphasis on factors related to customer 
services, innovation and costs. 
Thirdly, as far as the supervision function – management evaluation – of the 
board of directors is concerned, we observed that after privatization there is a 
clear tendency to greater control of strategic decisions, which is consistent with 
the reinforcement of strategic factors mentioned above. In addition, there is a 
significant increase in the frequency of requests for information about managers 
– among other variables – probably as a mechanism to exert this control. We 
should also point out that these control systems are the result of negotiation 
between top managers and the board of directors. In general, after privatization 
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the monitoring function exercised by the board of directors over managers 
increases, which leads to greater efforts to capture strategic decisions made by 
the management team.
Finally, there were also significant changes in both periods (pre- and post-
privatization) in the measures of performance used to evaluate the managers. 
Like the factors of competitiveness, the measures that seem to be most 
important after privatization are those taken on issues of finance and quality. The 
performance measures used to reward managers require such external measures 
as benchmarking and stock exchange price (which were used much less before 
privatization). Thus, this multi-case study not only confirms the changes in 
measures of performance, but also outlines the direction of the changes that are 
expected in the use of performance measures after the process of privatization.
Our findings also confirm that the governance structures, with the 
presence of blockholders (especially financial institutions), helped to align the 
managers’ behavior with the interests of the new ownership through control 
and performance evaluation systems, thus revealing the relations between the 
macro-organizational level (the firm’s governance structure) and the micro-
organizational level (performance evaluation systems). 
This research has some limitations. Firstly, the effects of corporate governance 
on control and performance evaluation systems need to be analyzed, but the 
influence of these changes on firm efficiency after privatization also needs to be 
evaluated. Secondly, it would also be interesting to evaluate how different types 
of blockholder can influence the effects of privatization. 
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